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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(j) (1953, as amended) in that this appeal 
concerns review of a final Order and Judgment of the Third 
District Court, and the Utah Court of Appeals does not have 
original jurisdiction over said Order and Judgment. 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it 
struck Appellant's pleadings, entered Appellant's default, and 
entered Judgment upon that default, due to Appellant's Chairman's 
failure to present himself for deposition and failure to make 
discovery. 
The applicable standard of review is whether or not 
the trial court's exercise of discretion with relation to the 
imposition of sanctions pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 37(d) is 
arbitrary, capricious, or a clear abuse of discretion. See 
Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 239 (Utah 1970). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure reads 
as follows: 
If a party or an officer, director, or 
managing agent of a party or a person 
designated under Rule 30(b) or 31(a) to 
testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to 
appear before the officer who is to take 
his deposition, after being served with a 
proper notice, or (2) to serve answers or 
objections to interrogatories submitted 
under Rule 33, after proper service of the 
interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection 
submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
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service of the request, the court in which 
the action is pending on motion may make 
such orders in regard to the failure as are 
just, and among others it may take any 
action authorized under Paragraphs (A), 
(B), and (C) of Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule. In lieu of any order or in addition 
thereto, the court shall require the party 
failing to act or the attorney advising him 
or both to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, caused by the 
failure, unless the court finds that the 
failure was substantially justified or that 
other circumstances make an award of 
expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this 
subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is 
objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as 
provided by Rule 26(c). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 37(d). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the Order Granting Sanctions 
and Default Judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, J. Stirba presiding, against Appellant. 
The underlying case is a suit for the collection of 
attorneys fees which Appellee claims are owed, and unpaid, for 
services rendered. Appellant claims that the fees, as billed and 
claimed, are excessive, and beyond the scope of the oral 
agreement between the parties, and indeed, beyond the scope of 
reasonableness. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This action began as a suit for the collection of 
attorneys fees billed by Appellee (hereinafter referred to as 
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"Watkiss"), for services rendered on behalf of Appellant 
(hereinafter referred to as "Foa"). 
In 1986, Foa was sued in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, in a case styled Daw, 
Incorporated v. American Home Assurance Co., et al., Civil No. 
86C0330W. Watkiss was retained to represent Foa in that action, 
and obtained a favorable result. 
In 1987. Watkiss billed Foa for the legal services 
rendered. Foa refused to pay the bill as submitted by Watkiss, 
because Foa objected to the inclusion of a $10,000.00 
"exceptional result" fee, as well as an hourly charge for one of 
the attorneys involved of $110.00 per hour. Foa claimed that the 
agreed rate was $105.00 per hour. 
Watkiss filed this action for collection of the 
attorneys fees, as billed, on August 26, 1987. Foa filed a 
Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, which was 
denied on September 12, 1988. 
Watkiss filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, based 
upon Affidavits filed supporting its claim that the attorneys 
fees, as billed, were reasonable and necessary. Foa defended, 
using the affidavit of its then attorney of record, Lynn Charles 
Spafford, to oppose the affidavits regarding the reasonableness 
and necessity of the attorneys fees as billed by Watkiss. 
Watkiss' Motion for Summary Judgment was granted on November 1, 
1988. 
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On March 22, 1991, the November 1988 Summary Judgment 
was reversed by the Utah Supreme Court, and remanded for trial on 
the issues of fact raised by the Affidavit of Lynn Charles 
Spafford. 
After noticing the deposition of Foa?s chairman, 
Conrad Foa, and after Mr. Foa failed to appear for the scheduled 
deposition, Watkiss moved the trial court for an order striking 
Foafs pleadings and an entry of default judgment. 
On December 2, 1991, the trial court ordered Conrad 
Foa to appear for deposition on or before December 20, 1991 at 
12:00 noon, and to pay $500.00 in attorneys fees. 
Conrad Foa's deposition was rescheduled for December 
17, 1991. Mr. Foa failed to appear for this deposition. This 
caused Appellant Foa to file a motion to change Conrad Foa's 
deposition to New York City. 
Because of Conrad Foa's failure to appear for the 
December 17, 1991 deposition, and citing Conrad Foa's failure to 
abide by the trial court's December 2, 1991 order, on January 14, 
1992, the trial court granted Watkiss' second motion for 
sanctions, and directed plaintiff's counsel to prepare an order 
and default judgment. 
After Foa's counsel withdrew from this matter, and 
after being persuaded to reappear, Foa, through its counsel, 
moved the trial court to vacate its order granting sanctions. At 
the time of said motion, no default judgment had been submitted, 
nor entered. 
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On February 18, 1992, the trial court, via minute 
entry, denied Foa's Rule 59(e) Motion. 
On February 21, 1992, the trial court signed and 
entered its Order of Sanctions and Default Judgment. Foa filed 
its Notice of Appeal on March 19, 1992. 
C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL 
There was no trial of this case, as it was disposed of 
via Default Judgment in favor of Appellee. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
All page citations are to the Utah R. App. P. 11(b) 
pagination of the original record in this matter. 
1. Foa retained the services of Watkiss to represent 
it in the case of Daw, Inc., Plaintiff v. American Home Assurance 
Co.; National Union Fir Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, PA.; 
Plastro Tech Industries, Inc.; Foa & Son Corporation; and Does 1 
through 50; Defendants. (Civil No. 86 C 0330 W), pending before 
the United States District Court for the District of Utah, 
Central Division. (Complaint, p. 3). 
2. Watkiss represented FoaTs interest in the action, 
and obtained a favorable result. (Amended Complaint, p. 14). 
3. Watkiss' claim for damages against Foa includes a 
$10,000.00 exceptional result fee, and an hourly charge of 
$110.00 per hour. (Supreme Court Op. [March 22, 1991], p. 201) 
(See also Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 [1991]). 
4. Watkiss filed this action on August 26, 1987. 
(Complaint, p. 2). 
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5. Watkiss obtained denial of Foa's Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction on September 12, 1988. (Order, 
[dated 9-12-88], p. 58). 
6. Watkiss obtained summary judgment against Foa on 
November 1, 1988. (Judgment [dtd. 11-1-88], pp. 111-112). 
7. On March 22, 1991, the November 1, 1988 Summary 
Judgment of the trial Court was reversed by this Court, and 
remanded for trial on the issues of fact raised by an affidavit 
filed by Lynn Charles Spafford. (Remittitur, p. 200). 
8. Watkiss attempted, in October, 1991, to obtain the 
deposition of Conrad Foa, Foa's Chairman. Appellant Foa did not 
know that Mr. Foa would not appear for his deposition, and 
accordingly, failed to notify its counsel or Watkiss of the non-
appearance of Mr. Foa. Mr. Foa, however, failed to appear for 
his deposition on the scheduled date. Watkiss was then notified 
by Foa's counsel that Mr. Foa would not be appearing for his 
deposition. (Notice of Deposition, p. 254, Mot. for Sanctions, 
p. 262). 
9. Watkiss then moved for an order striking Appellant 
Foa's pleadings and entering default judgment. (Mot. for 
Sanctions, pp. 259-78). 
10. By Order dated December 2, 1991, the trial court 
ordered Conrad Foa to present himself in Salt Lake City for 
deposition on or before December 20, 1991 at 12:00 noon, and to 
pay $500.00 in attorney's fees by reason of his failure to appear 
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for deposition as scheduled. (Minute Entry [dtd. 12-2-91], p. 
291). 
11. Watkiss rescheduled Mr. Foa's deposition for 
December 17, 1991. (Notice of Deposition, p. 292). 
12. Mr. Foa refused to appear for deposition, which 
refusal caused Appellant Foa to file a motion to change the 
deposition to New York. (Second Mot. for Sanctions, p. 306; Mot. 
to Change Place of Deposition, p. 296). 
13. Watkiss filed a second motion for sanctions, 
citing Conrad Foa's refusals to present himself for deposition as 
ordered by the court. (Second Mot. for Sanctions, p. 304). 
14. By minute entry dated January 14, 1992, the Court 
granted Watkiss' second motion for sanctions, and directed 
Watkiss' counsel to prepare an order and default judgment. 
(Minute Entry [dtd. 1-14-92], p. 352). 
15. Three days after the Court's ruling, counsel for 
Foa withdrew from the case, thereby staying further proceedings 
for 20 days under Rule 4-506(c), Code of Judicial Administration. 
(Withdrawal of Counsel, p. 354). 
16. On February 4, 1992, Foa's former counsel 
reappeared in the case, and moved the Court to vacate its order 
granting sanctions. (Re-appearance of Counsel, p. 363; Mot. to 
Alter or Amend Order . . ., p. 358). 
17. Watkiss prepared a form of order striking 
defendant's pleadings and entering default judgment, which was 
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served on Foa's counsel on February 7, 1991. (Mem. in Opp. Mot. 
to Alter or Amend Order . . . , at Exhibit 2, pp. 377-378). 
18. On February 18, 1992, the trial court, via minute 
entry, denied Foa's Rule 59(e) Motion. (Minute Entry [dtd. 2-18-
92], p. 385). 
19. On February 21, 1992, the trial court signed and 
entered its Order of Sanctions and Default Judgment. (Order 
Granting Sanctions, p. 393). (Order Granting Sanctions, p. 393). 
20. The Judgment entered against Foa in this matter 
included damages awarded to Watkiss as follows: 
a. $40,583.07, representing the principal amount 
of Watkiss' claim; 
b. $19,106.30, representing interest accrued 
through February 10, 1992; 
c. $304.20, representing Watkiss' costs; 
d. $16,000.00, representing Watkiss' attorney's 
fees. (Order Granting Sanctions, pp. 393-394). 
21. No evidentiary hearing was held by the trial 
court before entering judgment for damages prayed in the Amended 
Complaint. 
22. Foa filed its Notice of Appeal on March 19, 
1992. (Notice of Appeal, p. 398). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A party's pleadings should not be stricken and default 
judgment should not be granted against that party, solely for 
disobeying an order to cooperate in discovery procedures, unless 
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this stringent measure is employed with caution and restraint. A 
party's repeated failure to appear for deposition is sufficient 
grounds for a trial court to enter default judgment as a 
sanction. However, in this case, Appellant Foa is being 
penalized for the failure of a fact witness, albeit the chairman 
of the board of Appellant, to appear and be deposed after proper 
notice. Entering Appellant's default, and judgment thereon, 
based upon a fact witness' failure to be deposed, was an abuse of 
discretion. 
The trial court should have held an evidentiary 
hearing to determine whether or not Watkiss was entitled to the 
damages claimed, and whether or not the damages claimed were 
reasonable. Furthermore, the trial court's entry of default 
judgment on Watkiss' claim for attorneys fees was an abuse of 
discretion, in that no hearing was held, nor were specific facts 
found to support the attorneys fees judgment. 
Finally, the trial court's entry of judgment on 
Watkiss' claim for the $10,000.00 exceptional result fee is an 
abuse of discretion, and is an unwarranted condonation of 
excessive and unreasonable attorneys fees. 
Regardless of the type of judgment imposed, a judgment 
should only be entered for amount to which a party is legally 
entitled. The trial court failed to find either entitlement, 
basis or reasonableness for the $10,000.00 exceptional result fee 
and the collection litigation attorneys fees.. This failure is 
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an abuse of discretion, and warrants a reversal or remitter of 
the judgment amount, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN STRIKING APPELLANT'S PLEADINGS 
This Court has held that the striking of a party's 
pleadings and granting of judgment to the opposing party solely 
for disobeying an order to cooperate in discovery procedures is a 
stringent measure, which should only be employed with caution and 
restraint. Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 
P.2d 410 (1964). 
Other appellate courts, when faced with similar 
issues, have held that granting default judgment should only be 
utilized as a last resort when other lesser sanctions are clearly 
insufficient to accomplish the desired end. See Burkhart by 
Meeks v. Philsco Products Co., Inc., 241 Kan. 562, 738 P.2d 433 
(1987). The Washington Court of Appeals held that the entry of 
default judgment and striking of pleadings must only be used as a 
sanction for discovery non-compliance when it is apparent from 
the record that the court explicitly considered whether a lesser 
sanction would probably have cured the improper behavior, and 
whether a refusal to obey a discovery order substantially 
prejudiced the opponent's ability to prepare for trial. See 
Snedigar v. Hodderson, 53 Wash. App. 476, 968 P.2d 1 (1989). 
[emphasis added]. 
In Bartholomew v. Bartholomew, 548 P.2d 238 (Utah 
1976), this Court held that a partyf s repeated failure to appear 
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for deposition was sufficient grounds for the trial court to 
enter sanctions, including default judgment, against the non-
complying party. Conrad Foa, the recalcitrant deponent 
herein, is not the defendant in this matter, but is only the 
defendant's chairman. While he was given notice of deposition, 
and was eventually ordered by the Court to appear and be deposed, 
he is still not the party in interest. 
Mr. Foa was a fact witness in Foa's defense against 
Watkiss' excessive claims for attorney's fees. The sanctions 
imposed upon Foa by the trial court were imposed because of a 
fact witness' failure to appear for deposition. Foa asserts that 
rather than strike its pleadings and enter default judgment due 
to one of Foa's fact witness' failure to obey discovery orders, 
the trial court should have ruled that Conrad Foa's failure to 
appear a second time would result in Foa being prohibited from 
using Conrad Foa as a witness in this action. 
Such a result would have been more in line with the 
rulings of appellate courts regarding the severity of sanctions 
and use of default judgment, and would have been a lesser 
sanction which would have still prevented Foa from profiting from 
its witness' failure to obey discovery orders. Such a result 
would have not prejudiced Watkiss, in that Watkiss would have 
then be freed from preparing to combat testimony of the non-
complying witness, and would have allowed Watkiss to disregard 
any proposed testimony of the non-complying witness. Finally, 
such a result would be substantially just and equitable, and 
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would have allowed Foa to proceed with its defense of this 
action, rather than suffer the severe sanction of being unable to 
proceed with its defense, and suffer default judgment, due to a 
fact witness1 failure to appear for deposition. 
Foa is a New York corporation, and as such is entitled 
to the respect and protections of having been duly incorporated, 
Conrad Foa, notwithstanding sharing the name of Appellant Foa, is 
not the appellant, and was not the defendant in this action. 
Appellant Foa is entitled to be treated as a separate entity from 
Conrad Foa, and should not suffer the sanction of default 
judgment due to the failure of an employee and fact witness to 
obey the discovery orders of the trial court. A lesser sanction 
could have been remedied, and was not. The entry of default 
judgment for failure of Foa's fact witness to obey the trial 
court's discovery order was too severe a remedy, visits extreme 
prejudice upon Foa, was an abuse of discretion, and should be 
reversed by this Court. 
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
IN ITS ENTRY OF SANCTIONS 
A. Entry of damages without an evidentiary 
hearing was an abuse of discretion. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court was within 
its discretion to strike Foa's pleadings, the trial court 
nevertheless abused its discretion when it entered default 
judgment against Foa without the benefit of an evidentiary 
hearing. 
The Court of Appeals has ruled that: 
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As a general rule, a 'default 
judgment establishes] as a 
matter of law, that defendants 
[are] liable to plaintiff as to 
each cause of action alleged in 
the complaint' . . . 
Nevertheless, it is still 
incumbent upon the non-defaulting 
party to establish by competent 
evidence the amount of 
recoverable damages and costs he 
claims. 
Arnica Mut, Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 965 (Utah App. 
1989), quoting Dundee Cement Co. v. Howard Pipe & Concrete 
Prods., 722 F.2d 1319, 1323 (7th Cir. 1983) [emphasis added]. 
See also Kwik Way Stores Inc. v. Caldwell, 709 P.2d 30, 38 
(Colo. Ct. App. 1985); Armijo v. Armijo, 98 N.M. 518, 650 P.2d 
40, 42 (Ct. App. 1982). 
Accordingly, assuming Watkiss was entitled to an award 
of sanctions, Foa was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the 
sanctions if those sanctions were to be default judgment on 
Watkiss' complaint. Watkiss' claims included a $10,000.00 
exceptional result fee, and an hourly charge for attorney time of 
$110.00 per hour. There is no dispute that there was no contract 
entered into between the parties. Before judgment could have 
been entered upon Watkiss' Complaint, the Court was required to 
hold an evidentiary hearing, to take evidence, and to judicially 
determine Watkiss' entitlement to its claimed damages, and the 
proper amounts to be awarded. The trial court's default judgment 
must be reversed, because Watkiss' claims were not for sums 
certain, Watkiss' claims included items which were clearly 
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excessive and not contemplated by the parties at the time of 
Watkiss1 beginning its services for Foa, and there was no hearing 
in the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages to which 
Watkiss is due. See Russell v. Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 
1984). 
B. Entry of default judgment damages of 
attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion 
Utah follows the well-established rule that attorney's 
fees cannot be recovered unless provided for by contract or 
statute. See Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 
1067, (Utah 1991). See e.g. Canyon Country Store v. Bracey, 781 
P.2d 414, 419-20 (Utah 1989); Turtle Management, Inc. v. Haggis 
Management, 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, it is agreed that no written retainer 
agreement was signed and therefore, no contractual claim for 
attorney's fees may be sought. See Watkiss & Campbell, supra, at 
1067. 
This leaves any entitlement to attorney's fees by 
Watkiss dependant upon statute. A statutory award of attorney's 
fees is governed by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1953, as amended), 
which provides: 
(1) In civil actions, the court shall 
award reasonable attorney's fees to a 
prevailing party if the court determines 
that the action or defense to the action 
was without merit and not brought or 
asserted in good faith, except under 
Subsection (2). 
(2) The court, in its discretion, may 
award no fees or limited fees against a 
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party under Subsection (1), but only if the 
court: 
(a) finds the party has 
filed an affidavit of 
impecuniosity in the action 
before the court; or 
(b) the court enters in the 
record the reason for not 
awarding fees under the 
provisions of Subsection (1). 
Utah Code Ann,, supra, § 78-27-56. See also Watkiss & Campbell, 
supra at 1067-68. 
Watkiss cannot base its claim for attorney's fees upon 
the statute, in that the statute clearly states that "the court 
shall award attorney fees to the prevailing party only if it 
determines (1) that the action is without merit and (2) that 
the action was brought in bad faith." Watkiss & Campbell, supra, 
at 1068. [emphasis added]. See e.g. Cody v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 
149, 151-152 (Utah 1983), Unless the Court finds both elements 
of the statute, it cannot award attorneys fees. 
In the Arnica case, supra, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated that in awarding attorneys fees under § 78-27-50, supra, 
"the trial court must make findings that (1) the claim or claims 
were without merit, and (2) the party's conduct was lacking in 
good faith." Arnica, supra, at 966 [emphasis added]. Without 
specific findings, this Court has ruled that a "reviewing court 
cannot determine whether the award of attorney's fees was based 
upon a meritless claim brought in bad faith or simply because the 
recovering party prevailed." Watkiss & Campbell, supra at 1068. 
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In the instant action, the trial court failed to enter 
any findings regarding meritless defenses or bad faith. This 
absolute absence of findings, coupled with the lack of any 
contract whatsoever, renders the trial court's entry of default 
judgment damages of attorneys fees against Foa an abuse of 
discretion. This Court should vacate the trial court's award of 
attorney's fees. See e.g. Arnica, supra at 966. 
C. Entry of default damages upon 
Appellee's claim for a $10,000.00 exceptional 
result fee and for principal damages arising 
from $110.00 per hour charges was an abuse of 
discretion. 
This Court has ruled that a judgment against a 
defaulting party must be reversed where plaintiff's claims for 
damages were not for sums certain, and a hearing was not 
conducted by the trial court to ascertain the amount of damages 
to which the plaintiffs were entitled. Russell v. Martell, 681 
P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984). As noted above, the trial court failed to 
hold a hearing regarding damages after entry of default in this 
matter. Additionally, the trial court failed to enter any 
findings supporting its award of default damages. 
A judgment rendered under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure must contain only a judgment to which a party is 
entitled as a matter of law. See e.g. Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 
934 (Utah 1979). By analogy, Foa asserts, a judgment rendered 
under Rules 37 and 55 must also contain only those damages to 
which a party is entitled as a matter of law. It would be 
manifestly unjust and unwise to allow trial courts to enter 
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default judgments for damages to which the non-defaulting party 
is not entitled as a matter of law. Such a practice would 
destroy the validity and legitimacy of court proceedings and 
court orders upon which our judicial system is based. 
In this case, no contract or retainer agreement was 
entered by the parties. Watkiss rendered legal services, and 
upon the conclusion of those services, presented Foa with a bill 
for $40,583.07. Included in the bill was a charge of $10,000.00 
for "exceptional result," and charges for attorney time at 
$110.00 per hour. Watkiss1 was given to understand that attorney 
time would be charged at $105.00 per hour. See Watkiss & 
Campbell, supra, at 1062. 
Rule 1.5 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct 
provides, in pertinent part: 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an 
agreement for, charge or collect an illegal 
or clearly excessive fee. A fee is clearly 
excessive when, after a review of the 
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would 
be left with a definite and firm conviction 
that the fee is in excess of a reasonable 
fee. Factors to be considered as guides in 
determining the reasonableness of a fee 
include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, 
the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved and the skill 
required to perform the legal 
service properly; 
(2) The likelihood, if apparent 
to the client, that the 
acceptance of the particular 
employment will preclude other 
employment by the lawyer; 
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(3) The fee customarily charged 
in the locality for similar legal 
services; 
(4) The amount involved and the 
results obtained; 
(5) The time limitations imposed 
by the client or by the 
circumstances; 
(6) The nature and length of the 
professional relationship with 
the client; 
(7) The experience, reputation 
and ability of the lawyer or 
lawyers performing the services; 
and 
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or 
contingent. 
(b) When the lawyer has not regularly 
represented the client, the basis or rate 
of the fee shall be communicated to the 
client, preferably in writing, before or 
within a reasonable time after commencing 
the representation. 
Utah R. Prof. Cond. 1.5(a), (b). [emphasis added]. 
No hearing was held to determine the reasonableness or 
excessiveness of Watkiss' fees upon the entry of Foa's default. 
There was no contract between the parties. In the absence of a 
written contract between the parties, Watkiss1 claims for 
services must sound as a claim for quantum meruit, rather than 
breach of contract. See e.g. Parents Against Drunk Drivers v. 
Graystone Pines Homeowners' Ass'n., 789 P.2d 52 (Utah 1990). 
Damages under a quantum meruit theory are not sums certain, and 
therefore an evidentiary hearing should have been held. The 
Court of Appeals also held that in order to determine the amount 
an attorney is entitled to under a theory of quantum meruit, the 
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Court should look initially to the amount which the parties 
reasonably intended the attorney to be compensated. See Parents, 
supra, at 57. "If the amount the parties reasonably intended 
[the attorney] to recover is not discernable, the Court should 
award [the attorney] the reasonable value of his services." Id. 
at 58. 
In this case, there was no hearing, and consequently 
it was impossible for the trial court to determine either the 
amount the parties intended as compensation, or a reasonable 
amount. An evidentiary hearing should have been held to 
determine the reasonable value of Watkiss1 services. Foa asserts 
that whatever these reasonable fees would have been found to 
include, they most definitely would not have included a 
$10,000.00 "exceptional result" fee. Lawyers are engaged to 
represent their clients, and to zealously advocate those clients' 
positions. If indeed the result achieved by Watkiss was 
extraordinary, it was still no less than what was achieved by 
doing its job. Awarding Watkiss a $10,000.00 "exceptional 
result" fee implies that simply paying an attorney his or her 
hourly rate will not ensure the attorney's most devoted efforts, 
and that extra compensation must be provided to guarantee the 
attorney's "extraordinary" efforts. Such a practice cannot be 
condoned, nor should it be implied. This inference is surely not 
what Watkiss intended when it claimed its exceptional result fee, 
however, this inference is certainly what will abide this case 
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should the $10,000.00 "exceptional result" fee be allowed to 
stand as part of the judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred when it struck Appellant Foa's 
pleadings, and entered default judgment upon Watkiss1 Amended 
Complaint, solely because Conrad Foa failed to appear for 
deposition and disregarded an order o£ the Court. The trial 
court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary hearing as to 
the entitlement of Watkiss to the amounts claimed in its Amended 
Complaint. The trial court erred when it upheld and awarded 
Watkiss1 claims for a $10,000.00 "exceptional result" fee, an 
unagreed $110.00 per hour fee and attorneys fees in prosecuting 
this collection action. 
By reason of these errors, Foa prays this Court to 
reverse the default judgment of the trial court and either remand 
for an entry of lesser sanctions, or remand for an evidentiary 
hearing as to Watkiss' entitlement to, and the legality and 
reasonableness of, the damages claimed by Watkiss in its Amended 
Complaint. 
DATED this 1^ day of July, 1992. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
A Professional Corporation 
A A. i W 
Spafford 
Clark A. Harms 
Attorneys for Appellant 
lcs\foa\opening.brl 
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. ,i.cU i« CLEHK'Ss urriut 
Salt Lake County Utah 
FEB 2 1 1992 
S^, Om Court 
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN 
VINCENT C. RAMPTON (2684) 
310 South Main Street, Suite 1200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL, a 
professional corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FOA & SON, a New York 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
RiT«iyot 
2-SH-clQ-<&\Wxx-~v 
ORDER GRANTING SANCTIONS 
FOR FAILURE TO MAKE 
DISCOVERY 
Civil No, C87-05684 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Sanctions for Failure tc 
Make Discovery having been submitted to the Court in accordance 
with Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Administration; the Court 
having reviewed the submittals of the parties and the record in 
this matter; and good cause appearing therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That plaintiff's Second Motion for Sanctions for 
Failure to Make Discovery be and hereby is granted; 
2. That defendant's Answer be and hereby is stricken and 
its default entered herein; 
3. That judgment be and hereby is entered in favor of 
plaintiff Watkiss & Campbell, and against defendant Foa & Son in 
the following amounts: 
a. $40,583.07, representing the principal amount 
of plaintiff's claim; 
b. $19,106.30, representing interest accrued 
through February 10, 1992; 
c. $304.2, representing plaintiff's costs herein; 
d. $16,000, representing plaintiff's attorney's 
fees; and 
e. Interest on the foregoing at the legal rate from 
and after February 10, 1992 until paid in full; and 
4. That this judgment shall be augmented in the amount 
of reasonable costs and attorney's fees expended in collecting 
said judgment by execution or otherwise as shall be established 
by affidavit. 
DATED this P-( S^ day of February, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I herewith certify -that I am a member of and/or employ 
by the firm of Watkiss & Campbell, 310 South Main Street, Sui 
1200, Salt Lake City, Utah and that in said capacity and pursuaa 
to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a copy of the foregoii 
form of Order Granting Sanctions for Failure to Make Discovery wa 
caused to be served upon: 
Earl S. Spafford, Esq. 
SPAFFORD & SPAFFORD 
425 East 100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
by hand delivery this ^ 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the ^Q^&ky of July, 1992, I mailed a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing OPENING BRIEF OF THE 
APPELLANT, postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Vincent C. Rampton, Esq. 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
170 South Main Street, Suite 1500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorney for Appellee 
